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. Our new strategy must provide the framework to guide our deliberate reductions to no more than the forces we need to guard our enduring interests -the forces to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crises, to retain the national capacity, to rebuild our forces should this be needed...and to...maintain an effective deterrent.
PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
-George Bush 1
Taiwan has experienced an "economic miracle"' 2 which could have a significant effect on this new strategy outlined by The students' first priority was economic parity for the students, faculty and government workers with the business community. The freedom to speak and to publish views different from the governments was their second priority. They wanted to elirinate graft and corruption in the government as a third priority. Establishing a democracy such as we have in the west was never the aim of the demonstration. The students' view of reform of the political system would allow political opposition and would show a greater willingness to react to the poverty and misery of much of the population that was not benefitting from the market economy.
For a time it seemed that the old guard within the PRC were as tolerant as they had tried to appear, that is, they had warmed to the idea of more individual freedom. But they showed their true colors and violently smashed the student revolt while the world watched.
The PRC leadership was unwilling to give in to government subsidies and wage control vice the market determination of salaries and wages. They were willing, however, to investigate the graft and corruption charges but the students did not believe the effort would be successful.
As Hu Ping, the leader of an earlier Chinese student movement said, "Many Chinese are accustomed to listening to two types of leaders: those with charisma and those with real power.
The first type usually go against the establishment. The second type usually oppose the sharing of power. The students were trying to establish a democratic movement, but they were not accustomed to paying attention to le~aders who had been selected through a systematic process.", 17 The very thing the students were seeking and their lack of understanding of the process they were seeking was part of the reason they were unable to follow their leaders and to know how far to push Beijing on their first try at freedom and democratization. This character trait/political background (lack of understanding of democracy and unwillingness to listen even to their own elected leaders) must be understood as the relation between the U.S. and the PRC continues a recovery to its pre-Tiananmen Square levels.
tMAT NOW
The balance of this paper will discuss specifically The PRC shows a remarkable resiliency and willingness to accept inevitable changes--unless \they think those changes will affect the security of the PRC. They react violently to security issues and will probably continue lo do so for the foreseeable
future.
An example of this seeming flexibility (and in this case, * how it effects the U.S.) is the January 1992 agreement on copyrights, trade secrets and patents.
The U.S. had strongly contested the PRC's disregard for U.S. patents and copyrights.
The PRC routinely copied U.S. technology and incorporated it into their products, some of which were exported to the U.S. U.S.
companies noted a total annual loss of $430 million annually to the violations. Loses were on everything from drugs and computer programs to clothing and movies. They even have a small data base (southern China) to understand how to run a pseudo-capitalistic economy if that becomes necessary. The USSR lacked even the slightest "mental infrastructure" when time came for change.
ror Taiwan?
The direction Taiwan will probably take is reflected in the territory. This is another example of both supporting the "China" position. Long lasting and seemingly unimportant disputes such as these will have to be addressed or they may become stumbling blocks to negotiation.
Taiwan is a powerful economic nation with a popularly elected government, a popular native-son as President, significant economic ties to the PRC and a six year plan to upgrade the infrastructure of the nation. 32 They have already extended a capitalistic tentacle into the southern part of the PRC--a tentacle that is growing and on which the PRC depends for part of its life blood. That tentacle has helped the southern region produce its own "economic miracle" which has given the region "...some independence..." so "...they more or less ignore But, it seems obvious that the part Taiwan is playing, and will continue to play, in the democratization of the PRC is snall and subtle. Therefore, U.S. policymakers must not look to Taiwan to have any significant near-term influence on the political policies of the PRC. L.S. policymakers must deal with the PRC on a one-to-one basis.
We should strongly discourage any attempt by the PRC to unify China by force; while at the same time clearly understanding that there are some serious gulfs between the two countries that can only be worked out by the two of them over time. The U.S.'s best interest will be served by maintaining a relationship with both and doing nothing at this juncture that would place U.S. policy at odds with the goals of either.
Unfortunately, that might seem to say that the U.S. should do "nothing" and that is right to an extent. An understanding of this is of critical importance to U.S.
policymakers who might try to push one or the other toward a "non-Chinese" decision, either economic or political. The U.S.
must basically stay out of the affairs of both Taiwan and the PRC at this point unless either's actions directly effects the U.S.
(i.e., pater.ts, copyrights). The U.S. government must continue to act in its capacity as the most powerful and influential member of the UN and must not try to act unilaterally to affect significant change within either "China".
Threats The reality of "One China" might exacerbate the economic woes of the U.S. and its relationship to both members, however.
The possibility of further cooperation between the two members could worsen the already horrible trade deficit between the U.S.
and both. This, however can be turned to good if. as I proposed earlier in this paper, U.S. policy makers seize the opportunity and make the "One China" a trading partner rather than an enemy..
The relationship between the two members of "One China"
bodes well economically for the region as a whole. Taiwan is already branching in all directions looking for cheap labor.
Several Southeast Asian countries are getting a much needed infusion of Taiwanese capital (as well, of course, is the southern part of the PRC). As this economic interdependence grows, the region will tend to stabilize.-If the two countries continue to cooperate economically and allow this cooperation to overflow into the rest of the region, the political temperature will continue to warm and the U.S. will.
be a beneficiary as well.
While understanding the military and economic aspects of the "One China Card" and how they relate to U.S. and regional security, U.S. policy makers must continue to place primary focus on the region as economic "partner" vice " 
